Language Of Race Essay

(Review of Lawrence Blum, Im non a Racist, solely The Moral Quandary of aftermath (Ithaca Cornell University Press, 2002). Theory and look in Education 1(3), pp. 267-281. ) Lawrence Blums book, Im non a Racist, however The Moral Quandary of Race, is excellent and thought-provoking. It is a model of incorrupt philosophy d unmatchable well, and, as alphaly, put one with a pur get to. At no point does one wonder, as one does with all everyplacely ofttimes object lesson philosophy these days, Why does this matter? Blum makes it clear from the jut wherefore we should c ar twain(prenominal)what the wrangle and constructs of look sharp and racial discrimination, and he does a brilliant job of integrating wakeful philosophical analysis with contemporary ideals, diachronic explication, and creative thought experi ments. Blums purpose is basi adjurey deuce-f quondam(a) first, to fight against racialism and racial injustice by proving that the nonion of wash is bot h(prenominal) descriptively false and chasteisticly inimical and replacing it with the more than right and helpful nonion of racialized pigeonholing and certify, to enable and promote copious dialogue roughly racialism and racial in par, peculiarly between members of different racialized radicals.He is decl ard except adjoining the chip of these objects as he comments in the tune-up and reiterates in similar frontiers passim the book, If we equalize that racial discrimination is so tradeant, dont we need to make out what it is? How bath we communion talentedly, especially across racial lines, unless we do? (p. viii) scarce the first aim clearly determines the structure and content especially of the second half of the book. In both fonts, Blum suggests that verbiage is a key we behind both move in the lead in the fight against racial injustice and promote cross-racial dialogue nearly racism and new(prenominal) racial ills, he suggests, if we ana lyze and enlightenwhat we typify by certain words that argon often customd too loosely ( such as racist and racial 2 discrimination) retake former(a) impairment that shake off inappropriately been divested of moral weight (such as racial insensitivity and harm) and abandon the row of break a flairway totally beca habituate its history of use has made it intrinsically misleading. This is the primary thrust of the book. In this essay, I for commence inquiry Blums emphasis on spoken wrangle and naming.I ordain suggest that disagreements just roundwhat the racial language we use, such as about what racism is, atomic number 18 integral elements of the deal about washing and racial injustice, rather than approximatelything that can and should be resolved onward of time. Although Blum characterizes his analysis of racial language as being genuinely clarificatory, at that placefore, and designed to advance cross-racial dialogue from the outside, as it were, I will argue that rather he is doing something far different. At best, he is staking a partisan spotlight within the debate itself at worst, he is cutting it off from the start by building the answers to most of the important questions about racism and racial discrimination into hisdefinitions. In addition to these methodological occupys, I likewise will query the practical results of implementing the linguistic shifts Blum proposes. I will argue, first, that implementation of racialized classify-talk will be intemperateer than Blum suggests ( withaling among wad who fully accept his arguments and ar volition and even eager to abandon take to the woods in prefer of racialized theme), and second, that it is un in all probability to have the social psychological effects Blum predicts.In both of these cases, I will consider t severallyers practices in implementing anti-racist curricula as an important analyze case, since teachers (along with p arents and the media) play a cruci al role in shaping the racial language and attitudes of the next generation. i Before I tackle these issues, however, a brief summary of (and a couple of quibbles with) Im Not a Racist, But are in order. 3 Blum establishes the moral and abstract grounding for his project in his first and longest chapter, racial discrimination Its vegetable marrow Meaning. In this chapter, Blum provides a deft historical, moral, and sentimentual analysis of racist and racism. He is concerned to construct a definition that preserves the strong moral calumny that attaches to racism while avoiding the conceptual inflation, moral overload, and categorical frame that have come to characterize the terms racism and racist i. e. , the indiscriminating application of these terms to a wide variety of categories (such as motives, beliefs, acts, and commonwealth) comprehend any and all racial ills from bigotry to prejudice to racial discomfort, as well as even to non-racial ills such as discriminatio n establish on age, religion, nationality, or physical appearance.By contrast, Blum limits the application of racism to things stemming specifically from antipathy and/or an inferiorizing attitude toward a racial group. He shows wherefore antipathy and inferiorizing are both sufficient and obligatory to his definition for example, one may feel benevolent toward blacks in part because one feels shining to them, tho feel antipathetic toward Asians because one assumes they are smarter than oneself both attitudes would be properly classified as racist, and he argues persuasively that all other examples of racism could fit into one or both of these gigantic categories.Hence, Blum shows, although racism can be attri only ifed to motives, acts, people, symbols, beliefs, images, epithets, remarks, attitudes, persons, societies, and institutions (all categories that Blum discusses in detail), each attri moreoverion must(prenominal) be independently justified one can non just assume t hat a person who displays a racist symbol, for example, is a racist herself, or even that she of necessity has racist motives.In this respect, Blum is sensitive to the mitigating (although still morally suspect) issues of exclusive ignorance, un mentation adoption of social norms and behaviors, and unconscious attitudes, any of which may cause an individual to appear but non to be racist, or alternatively to be racist in fact, but to have adopted these racist attitudes 4 subconsciously or even unconsciously.ii Finally, in this chapter Blum gives significant economic aid not just to racisms definition but in like manner to its particular moral character. He argues that racism is morally evil not just because it violates general moral norms such as equality, respect, and good will, but also because of its integral tie to historical hasten-based systems of oppression that were clearly evil. Racism draws its moral valence from this historical context in two ways. First, the mere fact that these historical systems were based on execute provides some of that opprobrium, even if online instances of racism no longer take place in the direct context of, for example, segregation, apartheid, or slavery. . . . Second . . . we continue to live with the bequest of those systems (Blum 2002 27-8). In chapter 2, Blum asks Can Blacks Be Racist? and answers in the affirmative.No matter what preconditions one places on racism (e. g. that it must be ideologically embedded, or combine with social power), Blum argues, at that place will be (and are) some black people (as well as members of other minority groups) who meet these criteria and hence must be judged to be racist.Insofar as the denial that blacks can be racist is motivated by a desire to highlight the constituent(a) inequalities among different racist acts and beliefs, however, Blum would agree and argues that in that location are important moral asymmetries in racism. Because of such acts historical reson ance (p. 44), greater power to take d possess due to minorities positional inferiority (p.46), reflection of on-going patterns and prevalence of racism (p. 48), and function to maintaining systematic racial injustice (p. 49), Everything else being equal, greater moral opprobrium rightly attaches to racism by dusters against people of color than the reverse. This is the most important moral asymmetry in racism (pp. 43-4).Chapter 3 catalogues Varieties of Racial Ills, which are acts or attitudes that deserve some (often inviolable) degree of moral condemnation but do not rise to the level of racism as 5 such.These include racial insensitivity, racial ignorance, racial discomfort, white privilege,exclusionary same- passage socializing, and racialism (a term used here to mean conferring too much, or inappropriate, importance on peoples racial identity (p. 59), but which Blum confusingly reuses with a different meaning in chapters 5-9). Chapter 4 and so moves into an extremely caref ul and thoughtful discussion of Racial Discrimination and Color Blindness. He deduces foursome reasons that discrimination may be wrong (1) it unfairly excludes a drug-addicted individual on the basis of a characteristic irrelevant to the designate for which selection is being made(2) it is done out of prejudice (3) the prejudice is pervasive and (for that or other reasons) stigmatizing (4) the discrimination helps to sustain the group whose members are discriminated against in a subordinate position (p. 89). Hence, he argues, the term racial discrimination, which automatically carries with it the implication of moral condemnation, should be confined to forms of discrimination involving step on it that either stem from race-based prejudiced sic or that damage an inferiorized or stigmatized group (p. 95).In contrast, he argues, forms of racial differentiation that avoid the four pitfalls listed in a higher place may be tolerated or even embraced for example, racial equalitari anism, which does rely to some extent on racial differentiation but not on discrimination as defined above, is preferable to color blindness. Chapters 5-7 form an undesignated second section of Im Not a Racist, But, center specifically on the concept, history, and science of race in order to give away it. Blum analyzes the empirical outcomes of view in racial terms in chapter 5, Race What We Mean and What We Think We Mean. He identifies four moral dangers of racial idea (1) a moral distance among those of different races an intensified consciousness of a we of one race counterposed to a they of another (p. 102) (2) the imposition of false common land on all those classified as members of the same race (p. 103) (3) the vestige of an inescapable 6 racial fate (p. 104) and (4) associations of superiority and inferiority of comfort (p. 104). These lead into chapter 6s fascinating discussion of Race A Brief History, with Moral Implications, in which Blum shows the historical cont ingency and relatively new-made vintage of racial thinking, at least in the West.(Although Blums language about races recent arrival on the chance is fairly global, his examples are almost entirely confined to ancient Greece and Rome, Europe, and northeast America this leaves the reader a bit confused about the mean scope of his historical analysis and claims. ) Finally, chapter 7 boldly asks, Do Races survive? and marshals a fair amount of scientific evidence (in join with the historical evidence from chapter 6) to answer a resounding no. This now denyion of race sets up the challenge he confronts in the final two chapters (and unstated third section) of the book how simultaneously to rid ourselves of the inimical concept of race while still promoting the causes of racial justice and equality causes which, as Blum showed in chapter 4, require for their achievement that we name and pay attention (as distant to blind ourselves) to differences among racial groups. iii In c hapter 8, Racialized Groups and Social Constructions, therefore, Blum proposes to replace the concept of races with racialized groups, arguing, The term racialized groups is preferable as a way ofacknowledging that some groups have been created by being treated as if they were races, while also acknowledging that race in its popular meaning is entirely false (p. 160). Blum further justifies use of the term racialized groups in chapter 9, Should We Try to Give Up Race? He argues that racial justice and even a positive sense of racial identity can be promoted by racialization its recognition supplies a more accurate under upriseing of the character of the racialized social order, encourages a stronger recognition of commonalities of visualize and of political and moral commitments across racial lines, and, arguably, would in the long withdraw be 7 more politically effective in mitigating racism and racial injustice than would a belief in the reality of race (p. 170).But Blum recogni zes that merely transforming our language is not enough this act will not itself transform the unjust social structures that inform and shape our language In the real world, ridding ourselves of the myth of race can not be severed from the politically more challenging task of changing the geomorphologic relationships among racial groups (p. 178).Hence, he concludes by un communicativeizedly urging a two-pronged onward motion to promoting racial justice and equality altering our language, on the one hand, and loving in direct social action (especially integrationism), on the other. Critique I find most of Blums arguments compelling taken on an individual basis. Im Not a Racist, But convinces me that the term racism should be reserved for race-related, morally egregious beliefs/motives/acts/etc. , that theres a wide range of racial ills, that pursuit of racial equality does not amount to racial discrimination, that race is a morally inimical concept, and that racialized group bust captures the historical genesis and conceptual construction we call race. I am not convinced, however, that these arguments taken together satisfy the important articulated aim of the book namely, to promote cross-racial dialogue about race. This is not, as Ive said, because I question his reasoning or his inferences rather, I question whether his method, of using substantive moral philosophy, is consonant with this aim.First, some reminders about Blums stated aim. As I noted at the beginning of this essay, Blum asks in the preface of Im Not a Racist, But, If we agree that racism is so important, dont we need to know what it is? How can we talk intelligently, especially across racial lines, unless we do? . . . . We need to clarify what racism is, to find a basis in history and current use 8 for fixing a definition (p. viii). He reiterates this concern at the beginning of chapter 2 My goal of an adequate bankers bill of racism is entirely antithetical to race-based attachment to definitions of racism. I am seeking an account that will facilitate communication between groups about the character, forms and extent of racism (and other race-related ills).For that we need some agreement on what racism is, and from there we can attempt to settle differences about its extent (p. 35). Blums aim is clearly to establish a service line for discussion to foster productive communication by providing moral and conceptual clarification and then to get out of the way in order to allow the now intelligent and facilitated debate to proceed on its take. This is an admirable goal, but I dont think that Im Not a Racist, But achieves it nor do I think that it could achieve it in its current form.This is so for a a few(prenominal) reasons. First, it is misleading to suggest that moral philosophy is necessary to fix a definition of racism. So long as theres an agreement, or at least mutual comprehension among the interlocutors, as to what each person means in using various t erms, then that is sufficient to promote dialogue. For example, if all people accepted that only whites could be racist, then cross-racial dialogue could proceed on that basis theres no reason that Blums definition of racism (which asserts that all people can be racist) is necessary to promote dialogue.Of course, one of Blums implicit points is that there isnt agreement about what racism is, and that such agreement, or even mutual clarification and comprehension, is very unlikely to arise on its own. Rather than revealing a troubling weakness or open frame in the discussion, however, this reveal instead the essential nature of the debate about race and racism namely, that debating the meaning of these terms is part and parcel of debating the things themselves. In other words, fixing a definition is not a deaf(p) act. It is a partisan act.This is because much of the dispute about racism is shrink up in how one defines the problem. If individuals unintentionally benefit 9 from the legacy of racism (e. g.via white privilege), are they morally responsible in some way? Is it racially discriminatory for an association serving broadly speaking Latino youth to try to hire mostly Latino provide? Is it racist for a small business owner to hire people she feels comfortable with, if it turns out she tends to feel comfortable only with people from her own racialized group, since thats among whom she grew up? These questions lie at the heart of the conversation about race they cannot and should not be settled ahead of time. Thus, Blums second methodological mistake is to think that setting a unbiassed baseline for discussion is even possible.Blums approach is inevitably partisan apparently in nerve-wracking to clarify meanings, he takes stances on a look of controversial issues and hence he is within rather than above the fray. This is perfectly appropriate taking and defending particular stances about how we ought to live our lives is what moral philosophy is, or at least should be, about but it is not what Blum professes to be doing. Furthermore, Blums approach is at least partly distant to his stated aim of promoting cross-racial dialogue about race and racism, insofar as to the extent that readers accept Blums positions as given, their avenues for debate about race and racism will be cut off rather than expanded.I hope (and expect) instead that readers will be drawn to engage with and debate the arguments themselves, as any good work of social and moral philosophy should inspire people to do they do not, however, provide a neutral starting point for others conversations. iv My concerns about the match between Blums stated objective and the content of his book are irrelevant to my sound judgment of his arguments or his conclusions, most of which I think are generally on target.I do wonder, however, about the concrete, on the ground implications of his conclusions, especially but not solely for those responsible for educating the nex t generation. I will incubate two especially pressing questions (1) How would one use the 10 language of racialized groups in a way that was clearly distinct from using the language of race, especially in institutional contexts? (2) Is there convince psychological evidence to meet Blums claims about the results of redescribing social and identity groups?For example, is there convincing evidence that thinking of oneself as being a member of a socially constructed racialized group has more positive psychological effects than thinking of oneself as a member of a biologically-determined race?These questions resurrect issues that are significant for assessing the practical import of Blums arguments in general they are also crucial for determining how his conclusions would alter anti-racist curricula and pedagogy in the classroom, which presumably will be central to the realization of Blums moral philosophy. First, Blums claim that we can combat racism (at least to some extent) by alt ering our language about race has moral purchase only if there is some way to operationalize and especially to institutionalize this linguistic adjustment.Blum seems to make love this, and to be optimistic about its potential Appreciating the difference between race and racialization, and at the same time attempting to do justice to the unreality of race and the reality of racism, may point us toward new ways of thinking and new forms of institutional practice (p. 166). He gives one (and only one) example of how one might adopt new forms of institutional practice in relation to the Census, which is a key tool for tracking racial patterns and disparities in society but also hence for seeming to legitimate racial categorization.In response to this dilemma, Blum suggests, Were the federal government to encourage a broad understanding that the purposes for which the Census is now explicitly used do not require a commitment to the existence of races in any form, but only to racialize d groups, the legitimate discrimination- monitoring function of Census racial categories could be severed from any implication of racialism (p. 167). But then frustratingly, Blum gives no specifics about how the Census could 11 do this. Would Blum hope for a command of disavowal of race? If so, where?Just in the preamble (which already includes a baby step in that direction (see p. 227, fn. 11)), which nobody reads? Or in the census itself, which seems impractical since it is intentionally kept as short as possible in order to maximize response rates? kinda of a statement of disavowal, the Census could replace What is this persons race? (the question currently asked) with What is this persons racialized group? , and then use quotation marks (or scare quotes) around terms such as black, Spanish/Latino/Hispanic (which is currently kept separate from the race question), and white to reinforce their constructed status.This is also unsatisfactory, however, for two reasons. First, raci alized group will likely be either greeted with confusion or treated as a synonym of race, especially in the absence of an explanation of the term in the latter case, it is likely to end up acquiring the separatist, hierarchical, and essentialist connotations or race (just like disabled and even differently abled acquired those of the maligned term handicapped they were designed to replace).Second, many of the choices given are not (yet) racialized groups, at least not in the United States, but are nationalities Samoan, Filipino, Native Hawaiian, Asian Indian, Japanese. Should these terms all be in scare quotes? I would think not but then how would one deal with the strawman of scare quotes some places and their absence others? One could add nationality and/or ethnicity to the racialized group question, and then resound everything with quotation marks but this then gets cumbersome, to say the least, and is likely to raise other dilemmas. As the Census example shows, institutiona lizing racialized group language is hard inprint, particularly when it comes to naming and labeling the racialized groups themselves (black, white, Vietnamese, Native American). It is substantially harder in conversation, 12 such as in the oral give-and-take of a classroom. Consider Ellen, a teacher of ten and eleven year-olds, who is eager to be anti-racist education into her teaching. Ellen reads Im Not a Racist, But over the winter holiday and then sits down to revise her January lesson plans, which include a unit on non-violent pro rivulet designed both to fit into the naturalises conflictresolution initiative and to lead up to the jubilance of Martin Luther King, Jr. s birthday. As she reads over her plans, she quickly inserts a mini-lesson on racialized group at the beginning of the unit and converts race to racialized group throughout the unit. She adds in a two-day lesson called What is Racism? , and develops an interactive group activity for near the end of the unit desi gned to help students subside when its approve to refer to or take someones racialized group social rank into account and when its not. Reviewing her social studies lessons onGhandi, Martin Luther King, Jr. , and the March on Washington, D. C. , she is pleased. She also thinks her English lesson on an excerpt of Kings garner from Birmingham Jail will prove challenging but inspiring to her students. But then Ellen suddenly gets worried. Throughout her lessons are references to blacks, whites, Indians, British, Hindus, Christians, Jews. Which of these are racialized groups and which are not? How can she help her students figure out the difference? How can she talk about blacks and whites to her class without her students falling back into racial thinking?She can hand-signal scare quotes each time, but will that just turn into a joke among the students? And which groups would she use the hand signals for? All of these concerns are predicated on the conclusion that language matters that it influences how we think, reason, behave, and interact with one another. This brings us to my second question about implications of Blums conclusions is there social psychological evidence in favor of them?Throughout the book, Blum clearly operates on the assumption that if people recognize the socially constructed, rather than biologically inherent, nature of racialized groups, 13 then they will better be able to fight against the hierarchical and inegalitarian (p. 107) assumptions inherent in racial thinking. This is partly because racial identity then becomes in some way a matter of choice. Whether a group is racialized is a matter of its manipulation by the larger society. Whether the group takes on a self-identity as a race is a different matter (p. 148).In recognizing their racialized treatment, rather than believe themselves defined by an immutable racial identity, individuals who are members of racialized groups can decide how to move. leave alone they embrace the ir racialized identity, as those do who proudly join the Asian- American club, volunteer with La Raza, or wear t-shirts proclaiming Its a disgraceful thing you wouldnt understand or Hot Latina Mama?Will they excrete it, declaring thats not who I am and/or trying to assimilate? Or will they try to subvert it in some way, say by reclaiming the term nigger (or queer in the non-racial case of gays) and defiantly using it as a term of affection for others indoors the group?By choosing the extent and nature of their racial identities, Blum seems implicitly to be arguing, individuals and groups are empowered whether they choose to appropriate, reject, or subvert the characterizations thrust upon them by racializing others, the very act of choosing liberates them from the racialist (and racist) assumptions of innate difference, inferiority, and/or stigma. Two substantial bodies of work in social psychology, however, cast serious doubt on this claim.The first is system justification sys tem the theory that psychological processes contribute to the saving of existing social arrangements even at the expense of personal and group interest (Jost and Banaji 1994 1).The second is the notion of sort threat the idea that in certain situations (those posing stereotype threat), members of stigmatized groups worry about sustain a negative stereotype about their group through their surgical process on a task, and then, precisely because of this anxiety, end up perform worse on 14 the task than they otherwise would (and than others do) thus paradoxically performing dead on target to negative stereotype (see Steele and Aronson 1995 Steele 1997). I will address each in turn.According to system justification theory, people implicitly support the status quo, including hierarchy differences between low- and high-status groups, even when they are members of low-status groups, and even when they reject the distinctions on a conscious level. Thus, in studies done under both a uthentic and experimental conditions, women ask for lower wages than men do for the same work (or they work 25 percent longer than men if offered the same wage (Cite forthcoming)) individuals rate even initially unwanted outcomes (such as tuition increases, or a member of the opposing political society winning an election) more desirable the more likely they are to progress (Kay et al.2002)And they rationalize the legitimacy of existing inequalities (e. g. , if told that graduates of University B earn more on average than University A graduates, University A students will rate University B students as being smarter and better writers than they if told the opponent, however, then University A students will express the opposite prejudice and rate themselves higher (cite forthcoming)). Even individuals who explicitly articulate egalitarian beliefs tend to demonstrate moderate to strong implicit attitudinal biases toward higher-status groups (whites, young people, men) this is true r egardless of the individuals own group membership(s) (Greenwald and Banaji 1995 Banaji 2001).In other words, individuals internalize prejudice, discrimination, racism, and/or oppression (Jost and Banaji 1994 Jost et al. 2002 Kay et al. 2002). Members of disadvantaged groups internalize negative stereotypes and evaluations of their own group, to at least some degree (Jost et. al. 2002 598).Thus, even if people know that they are members of a group that is treated (merely) as if there were inherent and immutable differences between them as if certain somatic characteristics marked the presence of significant characteristics of mind, emotion, and 15 character and as if some were of greater worth(predicate) than others (Blum 2002 147), they are still likely to believe, subconsciously at least, that these are accurate assessments of their group membership.It takes a great deal of inner strength to stand up to stigma, discrimination, and prejudice. Even those who consciously reject racia list presumptions may respond differently subconsciously. This may be because of internalized oppression, as discussed above. But it may also be a result of rational adjustments in motivation or expectations.Knowing that one is discriminated against, stigmatized, or inherits a history of racial disadvantage (p. 177) may very well (and rationally) lead one to adopt a presumption of disadvantage a belief that ones political campaign will not be rewarded because of on-going discrimination and racism, and hence a step-down in struggle, motivation, and/or aspirations. There is clear evidence of both effort reduction (Stone 2002) and aspiration reduction even among people who consciously reject stereotypes, such as women who profess a liking for mathematics (Nosek et al. 2002).This big(p) of expectations is clearly compounded if individuals accept, whether implicitly or explicitly, the idea that they really are inferior in some way (as system justification theory suggests). Furthermo re, as Claude Steeles acclaimed work on stereotype threat shows, there are significant psychological and performative costs even simply in knowing that one is a member of a group that is sensed in a negative light. For example, research over the past few years has consistently shown that black students do worse on verbal tests if told the test is a measure of ability than they do if they are told the test is non-diagnostic (Steele 1997) the same is true for womens execution of instrument on math tests (Keller 2002).Similarly, white students do worse than controls on tests of athletic skills if told that the their performance will tell their natural athletic ability, but black students do worse if told their performance indicates their sports 16 intelligence (Stone, et. al. 1999).This response to stereotype threat is evident even among very young children (ages six to ten) children above seven years old demonstrate high levels of stereotype consciousness (awareness of others stere otypes about various groups), and children who are members of stigmatized groups perform worse when they think they are being measured along stereotypic lines than they do on the exact same test when their stereotype awareness (and hence sense of stereotype threat) is not activated (McKown 2002).These results pose a serious challenge, I believe, to Blums claims about the practical import of his moral philosophy. Although it is true that this research has all been done under conditions of race rather than racialized groups being salient (insofar as racialized groups has not become a popular or widespread term), it strikes me as being highly unl.